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The Executive Compensation Problem
by Susan Lorde Martin*
I. Introduction
Nineteen ninety-two is referred to as the year of the pay protest.'
In that political year, public attention focused on executive compensation
when President Bush traveled to Japan accompanied by the chief
executive officers ("CEOs") of twelve major United States corporations. 2
Comparisons were made between the relatively low pay of Japan's top
managers and the multimillion dollar pay packages that American CEOs
receive. 3 The press indicted American CEOs for satisfying their own
personal greed to the detriment of their failing companies, while Japanese
executives were lauded for having an ethic of personal responsibility that
encouraged them to resign when their companies did poorly. 4
Executive compensation became an attractive, populist issue for the
candidates in the 1992 presidential campaign. One study indicated that,
unbelievably, Americans think excessive executive pay is the main reason
for the loss of American jobs in the last decade. 5 Thus, not
surprisingly, both Republican and Democratic candidates proclaimed
executives' salaries too high.6 Candidate Bill Clinton said he would
"'end the practice of allowing companies to take unlimited tax deductions
for excessive executive pay."' 7 He proposed permitting companies to
deduct bonuses or severance payments only if they were linked to profits
and were offered to employees below top management. 8 Furthermore,
he indicated that he would permit shareholders to determine the
compensation of top executives. 9

*Assistant Professor of Business Law, Hofstra University School of Business; A.B. Barnard
College; J.D., Hofstra University School of Law.
1. Amanda Bennett, A Little Pain and a Lot to Gain, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1992, at RI
(special section Executive Pay).
2. Jill Abramson & Christopher J. Chipello, Compensation Gap: High Pay of CEOs
Traveling with Bush Touches a Nerve in Asia, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1991, at Al.
3. Id.
4. Anthony Lewis, Abroadat Home: MetaphorforFailure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1992, § 4,
at 13; Joseph Ehrlich, Manager'sJournal: Give Workers a Break by Taking a Cut, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 20, 1992, at A14.
5. Jill Dutt, Study Shows Anger over Executives' Pay, NEWSDAY, July 1, 1992, at 42.
6. Jeffrey H. Bimbaum, From Quayle to Clinton, PoliticiansAre Pouncing on the Hot Issue
of Top Executives' Hefty Salaries, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1992, at A14.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. KevinG. Salwen, Clinton Backs Executive Pay Set by Holders, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9,1992,
at Cl.
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Activist shareholder groups also began exercising their strength to
control management's pay.' ° Their activities are aided by recent
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") rules which make it easier
for shareholders to communicate with each other" and require more
complete disclosure of executive compensation packages.' 2
Not everyone, of course, thinks reform of executive pay is in order.
Some CEOs certainly do not. 3
Other traditionalists assert that
shareholders already hold the ultimate weapon against unpopular
corporate decisions: they can sell their shares."' Even if one agrees
that reform of the current system is desirable, the difficulty lies in
determining what kind of reform is appropriate and how it can be
achieved without bringing about greater corporate ills than it has
assuaged.
This article will explain briefly why advocates of the old sell-yourshares remedy are being disingenuous by proffering advice that clearly
does not work. Existing legal remedies available to shareholders when
they believe executives are being over compensated will also be
considered. '" In addition, this review will suggest that litigation does
not generally benefit shareholders in any significant way and, therefore,
6
encouraging additional shareholder litigation is counterproductive.1
Currently, activist shareholders, supported by new regulations, seem
to be making unprecedented headway in affecting top management and
their compensation. In light of this, regulation relating to executive
compensation will be explored 7 although regulation per se is not
necessarily effective. This article concludes that the best hope for having

10. See, e.g., H.J. Cummins, SEC Measures Give Shareholders a Voice, NEWSDAY, Feb. 14,
1992, at 53; Joann S. Lublin, Shareholders Campaign to Dilute Power of Chief Executives by
Splitting Top Jobs, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1992, at BI.
11. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Release Nos. 34-31326, IC-19031, 57 Fed. Reg. 48276-01 (Oct. 22, 1992) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. §§ 240, 249).
12. Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release Nos. 336962, 34-31327, IC-19032, 57 Fed. Reg. 48126-01 (Oct. 21, 1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§§ 228, 229, 240, 249).
13. A survey of CEOs indicated that only eight percent would be willing to have shareholders
approve CEO compensation. Chief Executives Guard Their Power--andPay, WALL ST. J., Apr.
14, 1992, at BI. Cf Labor Letter: High-Level Disagreement,WALL ST. J., June 23, 1992, at Al
(citing study indicating that over fifty-nine percent of CEOs think that shareholders should not have
more input into executive compensation).
14. See, e.g., Marianne M. Jennings, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the
Shareholders'Meeting,Bus. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 42 (satiric look at new SEC disclosure
rules).
15. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 37-40, 51-58, 61-62 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 63-110 and accompanying text.
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the pay packages of top executives reflect their actual worth is found in
regulations that force arms' length bargaining between management and
corporate directors. It is only through this bargaining that CEOs will be
treated like the majority of people in this country who work for a living,
instead of like the family business' favored child.
II. The Fiction of Shareholder Control
The traditional response of corporate management to complaints of
shareholder dissatisfaction with executive compensation is the invocation
of the so-called Wall Street Rule: displeased investors can vote with
their feet, that is, they can sell their shares.' 8 While literally true, that
rule certainly does not tell the whole truth. For large investors, it would
often be very impractical to sell their stake in a company in order to
register their dissatisfaction with executive compensation.' 9 Their assets
are too large and their diversification needs may be too important to sell
every time they encounter a displeasing corporate decision.'
If an
institutional investor created a portfolio that matches an index like the
Standard and Poor 500 Composite Stock Price Index, for example, it
would be unrealistic to expect protest changes of position. A sale would
distort the portfolio and increase costs.21 For small investors, the
transaction costs would make it too expensive to sell shares in order to
communicate disagreement with pay packages.'
Some CEOs assert that shareholders also have other ways of making
their feelings known: they can write to board members, withhold votes
or offer an alternative slate of directors.' In the past, however, such
activities were either ineffective, too complicated, too time consuming or
too expensive for shareholders to pursue in any meaningful way.
Nevertheless, it is not surprising CEOs would point to such methods for
18. NicoleBremner Csarez, Corruption,Corrosion, and CorporatePoliticalSpeech, 70 NEB.
L. REV. 689, 723 at n.226 (1991).
19.

OURMONEY'S WORTH, THE REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON PENSION FUND

INVESTMENT 37 (1989). See also Klaus Eppler & Edward W. Scheuermann, Overview of the
History and Current Uses of Proxy and Consent Solicitation Contests: ShareholderChallenges and
ManagementResponses,in PROXY CONTESTS, INSTITUTIONALINVESTOR INITIATIVES, MANAGEMENT
RESPONSES 1990, at 9, 22 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-6928,
1990).
20. OUR MONEY'S WORTH, THE REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON PENSION FUND
INVESTMENT, supra note 19; Eppler & Scheuermann, supra note 19.
21. John R. Bolton, A SecondLook at BoardroomReform, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1993, at A 14.
22. Mary S. Podesta, CurrentDevelopments Involving Rule 12b-1, in INVESTMENT COMPANIES
1988 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series 1988).
23. See, e.g. Amanda Bennett, Voices of Protest, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1992, at R6 (special
section Executive Pay) (citing H. B. Atwater, CEO at General Mills Inc. and chairperson of
corporate governance committee of the Business Roundtable, a group of 200 CEOs).

98

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

WINTER

1993

dealing with shareholders' dissatisfaction with compensation packages.
One study indicated that only eight percent of CEOs would be willing to
have shareholders approve their compensation.24
It is only recently that activist institutional investors and professional
money managers have begun to be more aggressive and more effective

in applying pressure to corporate directors, 21 a phenomenon that has
been denominated "relationship investing." 2 6 Shareholder activism
gained more attention from corporations because of the old, established
institutions that are engaging in it.7 Furthermore, these institutional
investors now view compensation as an important issue.2' Fidelity
Investments, for example, declared that it would vote against
managements that offer executives restricted stock programs with a
holding period too short to provide an incentive for management to
improve the company's performance.29 So far, however, there is little
evidence that shareholder activity has had a general impact on expanding
Large institutional investors can
executive compensation packages.'
focus only on a limited number of companies because of their own
resource constraints.3" Thus, non-Fortune 500 companies will probably
be ignored by institutional investors and the pay of their top management
will be unchecked by serious shareholder scrutiny. Even when investor
activists have become involved in compensation issues, they have not
been very effective. This year there have been over seventy proxy
proposals to restrict executive compensation, including those at GTE,

Aetna, Sprint, Transamerica and Waste Management, none of which has
been successful. 32
24. See supra note 13.
25. See, e.g., Susan Pulliam, Calpers Goes over CEOs' Heads in Its Quest for Higher Returns.
WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1993, at CI.
26. JohnR. Bolton, A Second Look at BoardroomReform, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1993, at AI4.
27. Susan Pulliam, Big Investors and Even Money Managers Join Holder Calls for Better
Bottom Lines, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1993, at C1.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. In 1992, CEOs earned an average of $1.3
million in pay, bonuses and exercised options, up eight percent from 1991. Shareholders Seek to
Limit Executive Pay, but None Prevail Yet, WALL ST. J., May 11, 1992, at A 1. But see Steve Lohr,
Pulling Down the Corporate Clubhouse, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, § 3 (Business), at 1 (citing
pay cuts forced on Lee Iacocca, CEO and Chairperson of Chrysler Corporation and John F. Akers,
CEO and Chairperson of I.B.M. Corporation and several others at very large corporations, by more
independent outside directors and aggressive institutional shareholders).
31. Stuart Mieher, Weak Force: Shareholder Activism, Despite Hoopla, Leaves Most CEOs
Unscathed, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1992. The California Public Employees Retirement System
("Calpers"), for example, focuses on only twelve companies. Id. The New York State Teachers
Retirement Fund focuses on twenty-five to fifty of the 1300 companies in its portfolio. Id.
32. Shareholders Seek to Limit Executive Pay, but None Prevail Yet, supra note 30, at Al
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III. Controlling Executive Compensation through Litigation
Shareholders have attempted to invalidate excessive compensation

for management through litigation.33 In such litigation, shareholders
generally argue that management has not given consideration for various

components of the pay package and, therefore, the granting of that pay
constitutes a gift or waste of corporate assets.' The essence of a gift

in this context is compensation being awarded without the corporation
receiving a benefit that is reasonably related to the compensation in
value.3 5 The essence of waste of corporate assets is the use of such
assets for improper or unnecessary purposes.36

One of the impediments shareholders face in pursuing such litigation
is the corporation's invocation of the business judgment rule as a bar to
judicial scrutiny. Courts formulated the business judgment rule 37 to
reflect the basic corporate principle that it is the directors, not the
shareholders, who manage the affairs of the corporation. As long as the
directors act in good faith to further corporate purposes, the business
judgment rule bars judicial inquiry into their actions .38 Traditionally,
executive compensation has been an area in which courts will not

(citing a study done by Investor Responsibility Research Center).
33. See, e.g., Internat'l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447 (1 lth Cir. 1989) (deciding a claim
for insurance coverage for settlement of derivative action alleging corporate waste in creation of
golden parachute plan); Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979) (derivative suit against
Household Finance Corporation, its officers and directors, to set aside stock option plan granted to
top management, asserting lack of consideration and corporate waste); Olson Bros. v. Englehart, 245
A.2d 166 (Del. 1968) (stock option plan challenged as constituting gift of corporate assets); DWG
CORP, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1988) (derivative suit asserted that excessive cash compensation
and options granted to Victor Posner and Steven Posner constituted corporate waste).
34. Smachlo v. Birkelo, 576 F. Supp. 1439, 1441 (D. Del. 1983); Michelson, 407 A.2d at
215-16; Olson Bros., 245 A.2d at 168; Brandon v. Chefetz, 485 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 (App. Div. 1985);
Aronoff v. Albanese, 446 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370 (App. Div. 1982).
35. Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 737 (Del. Ch. 1960).
36. Michelson, 407 A.2d at 217.
37. The principle has been widely recognized since 1932, W. CARY & M. EISENBERG,
CORPORATIONS 208-09 (5th ed. 1980), and is still generally relied on by courts. See, e.g., Wolgin
v. Simon, 722 F.2d 389, 393 (8th Cir. 1983); Asarco Inc. v. MRH Holmes A Court, 611 F. Supp.
468, 480 (D.N.J. 1985); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assoc., 600 F. Supp. 678, 685 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
See also Holmes v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 147 N.Y.S. 104, 107 (Sup. Ct. 1914). Holmes is an early
case that suggests the business judgment rule:
There is merely the assertion of the plaintiffs' disagreement with the directors as to the
expediency of the transaction ....
Because of this diversity of view, the court is asked
to revise the judgment of the directors, and substitute its conclusion for theirs . . . . 'This
is no business for any court to follow.'
Id.
38. See, e.g., Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1134 (D. Nev.
1985); Asarco, 611 F. Supp. at 473; PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985).
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substitute their judgment for that of corporate directors.39 Under the
business judgment rule, courts will not invalidate compensation plans as
long as the compensation is reasonably related to the services
rendered.' Nevertheless, courts have held that the business judgment
rule does not bar judicial inquiry into the actions of corporate directors
when there is a breach of either the fiduciary duty of care or the
fiduciary duty of loyalty.4 '

Thus, advisors to corporations counsel directors to make sure that
the directors' decisions on executive compensation are reflected in the
record as being made only after they have received expert advice and

information from management; after they have had ample time to
deliberate; and before any change of control proposals are
contemplated.42 In so doing, directors would hope to demonstrate their
satisfaction of their duty of care and, thus, avoid court scrutiny of their

compensation decisions. To keep the benefit of the business judgment
rule, advisors also counsel directors to demonstrate their satisfaction of
the duty of loyalty by having only outside directors on the Compensation
Committee.4' In reality, however, outside directors may have very

39. Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 679-80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd mem., 32
N.Y.S.2d 131 (1941); Spang v. Wertz Eng'g. Co., 114 A.2d 143, 144 (Pa. 1955). The Heller court
states:
If comparisons are to be made, with whose compensation are they to be
made--executives? Those connected with the motion picture industry? Radio artists?
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States? The President of the United States?
•.. Merit is not always commensurately rewarded, whilst mediocrity sometimes unjustly
brings incredibly lavish returns ....
Courts are ill-equipped to solve or even to grapple with these entangled economic
problems. Indeed, their solution is not within the juridical province. Courts are
concerned that corporations be honestly and fairly operated by [their] directors, with the
observance of the formal requirements of the law; but what is reasonable compensation
for its officers is primarily for the stockholders. This does not mean that fiduciaries are
to commit waste, or misuse or abuse trust property, with impunity. A just cause will
find the Courts at guard and implemented to grant redress.
Heller, 29 N.Y.S.2d at 679-680.
40. Rogersv. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1933); Internat'l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447,
1461 (11th Cir. 1989); Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 1979); Kerbs v. California
Eastern Airways, Inc., 90 A.2d 652, 656 (Del. 1952).
41. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273-74 (2d
Cir. 1986); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265 (2d Cir. 1984); Treadway Cos.,
Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764,
768-69 (2d Cir. 1980); Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Ind., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1134-35 (D.
Nev. 1985); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assoc., 600 F. Supp. 678, 685-86 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985); MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon,
Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1250 (Del. Ch. 1985), aftid, 505 A.2d 454 (Del. 1986).
42. See, e.g., Paul K. Rowe, Executive Compensation: Defending Executive Compensation in
the Courts: Substance and Strategy, PRENTICE HALL LAW & BUS., Apr. 1992.
43. Id.
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good personal reasons to be more loyal to management than to
shareholders ."
The nature of a derivative action also creates difficulties for
shareholders. The derivative form of action allows stockholders to bring
a corporate cause of action against the corporation's officers and
directors. 4 Its purpose is to protect the corporation from the misdeeds,
such as corporate waste, of its managers and directors.' To prevent
abuse of the derivative suit by shareholders, courts require that
shareholders satisfy a precondition by demonstrating "that the
corporation itself had refused to proceed [with the lawsuit] after suitable
demand [by the shareholder], unless excused by extraordinary
conditions." 47 Courts generally excuse demands as futile where "a
majority of the directors have participated in or approved the alleged
wrongdoing ... or are otherwise financially interested in the challenged
transactions. "' When demand is made, some states automatically defer
under the business judgment rule to the decision of a special litigation
49
committee of independent directors to terminate a derivative suit.
When the shareholder asserts that demand is excused, if the directors can
demonstrate that they have acted independently, in good faith and after
reasonable inquiry, then Delaware courts, for example, will use their
own business judgment to decide whether to permit the shareholder to go
forward with the lawsuit.5" Thus, litigating the executive compensation
issue is fraught with procedural difficulties that require a tremendous
commitment of time and money.
Probably the most significant barrier to shareholder success in
derivative suits challenging excessive compensation is the collusive
settlement."' The derivative suit loses its potency entirely as an
effective shareholder remedy if corporate management simply adds
something extra to the compensation package in expectation of a lawsuit,
and then has something built in to offer plaintiffs' attorneys as an
incentive to settle.52 Suits challenging executive compensation have

44. See infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
45. Rossv. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970).
46. Cohenv. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
47. Ross, 396 U.S. at 534.
48. Kamenv. Kemper Fin. Services, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 1711, 1719 (1991). See also Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984); Barr v. Wackman, 329 N.E.2d 180, 188 (N.Y. 1975).
49. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 & n. 10 (Del. 1981); Auerbach
v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001-02 (N.Y. 1979).
50. Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 788-89.
51. See, e.g., John C. Coffee Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiffas Monitor in
Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 12, 32-33 (1985).
52. Shareholdersuits are frequently settled out of court. Steven Prokesch, Too Much Gold in
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become commonplace; however, they frequently result in settlements. 5
And those settlements generally include large fees for the shareholders'
lawyers .5 Of ninety-eight proposed settlements in corporate class or
derivative actions (approximately one third involving alleged excessive
compensation or corporate waste) before the Delaware Court of
Chancery between July 1, 1989 and December 31, 1991, ninety-six were
approved by the court. 55 In those cases, the court approved attorney's
fees which equalled, on average, ninety-two percent of the amount
requested. 6 In addition, two thirds of the fee petitions were granted in
full 57 and thirty percent of the fees reflected rates of between $500 and
$1000 an hour. 8 These settlements are problematic because they lack
the usual adversarial relationship. Corporations expect large executive
compensation awards will be challenged by shareholders and will happily
deem merely minor or cosmetic changes as substantial benefits to the
corporation sufficient to warrant large attorney's fees for the
shareholders' attorney.
Unfortunately, courts go along with this
charade. 59
Some commentators advocate easing the procedural requirements for
shareholder derivative suits to make it easier for. shareholders to
challenge the actions of corporate directors.'
Nevertheless, this is not
likely to be very effective in keeping executive compensation reasonable
because it has been the lawyers, not the corporations or their
shareholders, who have been the primary beneficiaries of these suits.6

the Parachute?,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1986, § 3 (Business), at 1.
53. Id.; Rowe, supra note 42. For example, in 1985, executives at the former Signal
Companies were awarded golden parachutes of approximately $30 million. ALLIED-SIGNAL INC.,
JOINT PROXY STATEMENT-PROSPECTUS 18-21 (Aug. 9, 1985). The settlement of the shareholder
suit challenging those parachutes reduced them to approximately $18.2 million and awarded
plaintiffs' attorneys $3.5 million in fees and costs. Weinberger v. Shumway, No. 547586 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Nov. 27, 1985). The result of the litigation, thus, saved the corporation and shareholders
a mere $8.3 million while the plaintiffs' attorneys earned for themselves close to half as much.
54. Carolyn Berger & Darla Pomeroy, Settlement Fever: How a Delaware Court Tackles Its
'Cases, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 7. See, e.g., MARK IV INDUSTRIES INC., 10K (Feb.
29, 1992). All individual, derivative and class action claims asserted against the adoption of an
executive compensation "Incentive Plan" were settled and as part of the settlement the plaintiffs'
attorneys were paid fees and expenses of approximately $285,000. Id. at 14.
55. MARK IV INDUSTRIES INC., supra note 54.
56. Id. at 8.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. RobertT. Keeler, Business Letters: Judge Draws Reader'sBlood, Bus. L. TODAY, MayJune 1993, at 4.
60. See, e.g., John C. Coffee Jr., A Watchdog for the Guardians,A.B.A.J., May 1992, at 44
(endorsing the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project reforms).
61. Michael P. Dooley, Not in the Corporation'sBest Interests, A.B.A.J., May 1992, at 45.
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Moreover, the confrontational posture and expense of litigation is
certainly not the best way to improve corporate governance or
performance.62
IV. Regulation of Executive Compensation
The first piece of federal legislation that contained provisions
specifically directed at regulating executive compensation was the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984.63 These new rules were intended to discourage
the granting of excessive golden parachutes' by disallowing a business
expense deduction to the corporation for any excess parachute
payment65 and by imposing an excise tax equal to twenty percent of the
excess parachute payment on the recipient of the payment.' Congress,
in enacting these provisions, indicated that golden parachutes subsidized
corporate officers, who were already highly compensated, to the
detriment of shareholders and, therefore, the tax law should not
encourage such payments.67
*The evidence shows the ineffectiveness of the rules in curbing
excessive payments to executives whose companies were taken over by
others. Many ways remain for a corporation to ignore the feeble attempt
at limiting executive compensation." For example, the Tax Reform
Act of 198669 excluded from parachute payment treatment any payment
made to or from a qualified pension, profitsharing, stock bonus or

62. Mark J. Roe, Clearing Boardrooms Like GM's, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1992, at A16
(noting more collegial relationships between German and Japanese companies and their stockholders
and substantial influence of latter on former).
63. 26 U.S.C. §§ 280G, 4999 (Supp. 1m 1985).
64. A golden parachute is an employment contract entered into by a corporation and an
executive stipulating remuneration substantially in excess of the executive's usual salary and benefits
in the event that the corporation undergoes any change of control. See Susan L. Martin, Note,
Platinum Parachutes: Who's Protecting the Shareholder?, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 653 n. 2 (1986).
65. Deficit Reduction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 280G (Supp. 111 1985).
66. Id. at § 4999.
67. DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE
SENATE COMMITrEE ON FINANCE ON MARCH 21, 1984, S. Prt. 169, Vol. 1, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
175, 195-96 (Comm. Print 1984); GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE
DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 174, 199-207 (Joint Comm.
Print 1984) (commonly known as the Blue Book) [hereinafter BLUE BOOK]; JOINT EXPLANATORY
STATEMENT OF THE COMM. OF CONFERENCE, H. R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
757, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1445, 1537-42.
68. For example, some companies adopted a "gross-up" plan that required the company to
compensate beneficiaries of golden parachutes for the twenty per cent federal tax, in effect,
completely defeating the purpose of the tax by imposing its cost on shareholders. See, e.g., Tate
& Lyle PLC v. Staley Continental, Inc., No. CIV.A.9813, 1988 WL 46064, at *2 (Del. Ch. May
9, 1988) ("gross-up" costing corporation at least $13.8 million).
69. 26 U.S.C. § 280G.
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annuity plan.7' In addition, payments triggered by a change in control,
but made pursuant to stock options granted more than one year before a
change of control, would be considered "reasonable compensation" and
would not be subject to penalties.7 Furthermore, there was no reason
to expect that corporations would be unwilling to forego the corporate
deduction and increase the payment to corporate officers to offset the
excise tax. Corporate compensation consultants noted that whenever the
government puts limits on executive compensation, corporations
automatically restore the lost benefits.72
Various bills have been introduced in Congress to attempt to control
executive pay." In 1991, the Senate74 and the House75 introduced
the Corporate Pay Responsibility Act.
It would have required
corporations to include in their proxy statements shareholder proposals
in regard to compensation for directors or CEOs.76 Also, it required
proxy statements to contain "clear and comprehensive" information about
director and top management compensation including a single dollar
figure representing present, deferred, future and contingent compensation
paid to those holding these positions.' The bills, however, never made
it out of committee.
The Income Disparities Act 'f 199178, introduced in the House,
provided that corporations would not be able to take a tax deduction for
excessive compensation. Excessive compensation was defined as an
amount equal to twenty-five times the lowest compensation paid by the
employer for the personal services of any other employee. 79 It, too,
never made it out of committee.
As a candidate, Bill Clinton publicly supported a plan to eliminate
corporate tax deductions for executive compensation over one million
dollars a year.'
That plan became law in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993.81 Many business people view a million

70. 26 U.S.C. § 280G(b)(6).
71. BLUEBOOK, supra note 67, at 204.
72. Ellen E. Schultz, More-Equal Benefits Go to some Top Executives, WALL ST. J., May 25,
1992, at C1, C17.
73. See infra notes 74-75, 78 and accompanying text.
74. S. 1198, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
75. H.R. 2522, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. H.R. 3056, 102d, Ist Sess. (1991).
79. Id.
80. Michael Siconolfi, Wall Street Is Upset by Clinton's Support on End in Tax Break for
'Excessive' Pay, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1992, at Cl.
81. Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13211, 107 Stat. 312, 469-71. Employees covered by this
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dollar tax cap as merely symbolic because it would actually affect few
Furthermore, because it is the nation's largest
executives.'
corporations that pay salaries over one million dollars a year, they will
most likely choose to pay the additional tax rather than decrease pay
packages.' Also, the Act will likely have the unintended consequence
of actually legitimizing million dollar compensation packages just as the
1984 and 1986 tax acts seemed to legitimize golden parachutes rather
Moreover, compensation
than regulating them out of existence.
consultants will inevitably discover loopholes in the law. For example,
by using pension annuities companies could defer some compensation to

pay out in the future in a tax deductible form or to pay at a time when
a different administration changed the law once again, 4
While Congress was toying with various proposals for regulating
executive compensation, the SEC was also drafting new regulations that
The SEC approach is in
would indirectly affect pay packages.'
keeping with the basic proposition of the entire body of securities law
which is to protect investors by providing them with access to material

information.'
On October 22, 1992, new executive compensation disclosure
rules' and new regulations for communications among shareholders88
became effective. The purpose of the new disclosure rules is "to furnish
shareholders with a more understandable presentation of the nature and
The purpose of the new
extent of executive compensation." 89
communication rules is to reduce "unnecessary regulatory impediments

provision include the chief executive officer and the four other most highly compensated officers of
any publicly held corporation. Id. at 470. The law makes exceptions for commission income,
compensation due under a prior contract, and compensation earned by attaining performance goals
determined by a compensation committee comprised of outside directors. Id.
82. Amanda Bennett, Clinton Victory Wouldn't Slash Top Officer Pay, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3,
1992, at B1. A 1991 survey indicated that two thirds of the companies surveyed, 350 of the nation's
largest, paid their CEOs more than one million dollars in salary, bonus, and stock or stock options;
only thirteen percent of chief operating officers were paid over one million dollars; below that level,
compensation of one million dollars or more was rare. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., LaborLetter: Executive-PayDisclosure: Some Execs and Analysts Applaud New
SEC Rules, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1992, at Al.
86. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 37-39 (1976).
87. Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 48126-01 (1992) (to be codified at 17
.C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 240, 249); see also, John E. Balkcom, Coming Clean on Compensation, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 1992, § 3 (Business), at 11.
88. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, 57 Fed. Reg. 48276-01 (1992) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249); see also, John Pound, Freeingthe Proxy Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 1992, § 3 (Business), at 11.
89. Executive Compensation Disclosure, supra note 87, at § I.
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to communication among shareholders and others and to the effective use
of shareholder voting rights. "I
Together, the new rules would
theoretically enable shareholders to understand exactly what top corporate
executives are being paid, and then to act on that information,
influencing corporate decisions in that area.
The new disclosure rules require that proxy statements and other
SEC filings contain four compensation charts including a "Summary
Compensation Table" that sets forth all compensation paid to the CEO
and the four other most highly compensated executives (in the case of the
latter, limited to those earning over $100,000 in salary and bonus) over
the last three years. 9 A second chart must disclose the value of options
granted to executives assuming five percent and ten percent growth
compounded over the life of the option.' Alternatively, companies can
disclose the value of the options when granted.' The rules also require
that the Board of Directors' Compensation Committee indicate, in proxy
and information statements relating to the annual election of directors,
which performance factors it relied on in arriving at the CEO's
compensation and what general policy it used in arriving at the
compensation packages awarded to senior management.' In addition,
in order for shareholders to be able to compare executive compensation
with the corporation's comparative performance, those statements must
contain a line graph that demonstrates: (1) the cumulative total return to
the corporation's shareholders over a period of at least the last five
years; (2) the Standard and Poor's 500 Composite Stock Price Index for
that time period (or, if the corporation's stock is not included there, then
any broad market index where it is included); and (3) any recognized
industry index (the Dow Jones Transportation Average, for example) or
the performance record of a group of peer companies for the relevant
time period. 5
The new communications rules allow shareholders, who are not
seeking proxy authority and who do not have a substantial interest in
matters subject to a vote, to communicate with other shareholders
without having statement delivery and disclosure requirements.' The
SEC views this as an important change because under previous rules any

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, supra note 88, at § I.
Executive Compensation Disclosure, supra note 87, at § I.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b) (as amended Oct. 22, 1992).
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communication among shareholders could be very costly.' The person
doing the communicating had been required, inter alia, to prepare a
proxy statement and mail it to every shareholder of the company who
was deemed to have been solicited.98 If the communication appeared
in the public media, all shareholders would be deemed to have been
solicited and, thus, the cost of the mailing requirement would have been
hundreds of thousands of dollars.'
Those costs would deter
shareholders from discussing corporate decisions and performance,
thereby chilling shareholder attempts to participate in the corporate
governance process."° The new rules also require corporations, when
requested by shareholders (subject to certain conditions), to either
provide a list of shareholder names and addresses or to mail materials for
shareholders. 0 1 A practical effect of the new communication rules is
to make it easier for shareholders to submit proposals to other
shareholders for a nonbinding vote thus giving investors the opportunity
to participate in setting executive compensation. 102
These rule changes caused more comment than any other single
subject in SEC history.0 3
Shareholder groups and institutional
investors have applauded the new rules," 4 but some business leaders

97. Executive Compensation Disclosure, supra note 74, at § I. Former SEC Chairperson,
Richard Breeden, stated, "Our goal is to improve the flow and the quality of information to
shareholders and to remove restraints on their ability to react to that information." Kevin G.
Salwen, SEC to Allow Investors More Room to Talk, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1992, at C1.
98. Salwen, supra note 97.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (as amended Oct. 22, 1992).
102. H.J. Cummins, SEC Measures Give Shareholdersa Voice, NEWSDAY, Feb. 14, 1992, at
53. Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(c)(7) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that permits a
corporation to omit a shareholder proposal from its proxy materials if the proposal deals with a
matter concerning ordinary business operations, Grumman Corporation intended to omit a
shareholder proposal requesting that the Compensation Committee disallow cash bonuses to
management until Grumman's common stock and dividends exceed the value they held on March
31, 1986. Grumman Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 13, 1992), available in 1992 WL 26606
(S.E.C.), at *1. The SEC decided that
[iun view of the widespread public debate concerning executive and director compensation
policies and practices, and the increasing recognition that these issues raise significant
policy issues, it is the Division's view that proposals relating to senior executive
compensation no longer can be considered matters relating to a registrant's ordinary
business.
Id. at *3.
103. Salwen, supra note 97, at C9.
104. See, e.g., Earl C. Gottschalk Jr., Revolutionary Proxies: Read Them and Reap, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 29, 1993, at C I (quoting John Markese, president of the American Association of Individual
Investors); Kevin G. Salwen, Institutions Are Poised to Increase Clout in Boardroom, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 21, 1992, at BI (quoting Ralph Whitworth, president of the United Shareholders
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are complaining that the SEC went too far in their disclosure
requirements.'1°
They assert that such detailed disclosures about
compensation for top executives might help competitors discover
strategies related to market share or overseas expansion or the sale of
unsuccessful operations.'
They also argue that it may be harder to
recruit new board members who would not want their decisions to be so
easily scrutinized and who would fear increased litigation."° Such
arguments are not particularly persuasive. It seems at least as likely that
executives with extremely high pay packages would just prefer not to
have such information easily accessible to shareholders, the general
public and legislators who, if offended, could take action to hold down
the pay packages.
These kinds of protectionist complaints reflect a very shortsighted
management approach. Shareholders are increasingly requesting, even
demanding, a greater role in corporate governance. 08 The new rules
encourage a more informal exchange of information between

management, directors and shareholders so that bitter confrontations can
be avoided." °9 The rules promote serious discussion about corporate
issues instead of proxy fights and takeover attempts."0 Moreover, in
reality, experts expect the new rules will not result in significantly
increased shareholder activity because of the high cost of shareholder
challenges. "

Association and Eric Wollman, administrative manager of the proxy unit for New York City's Public
Pension Retirement System).
105. Joann Lublin, Executives Grumble about SEC Plan to Require More Pay Data, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 21, 1992, at BI (quoting Robert H. Malott, retired CEO of FMC. Corp; Bruce Atwater
Jr., chairperson and CEO of General Mills Inc.; Ray McGovern, general counsel for Omnicom
Group Inc.; Thomas Ashford, assistant general counsel for American Electric Power Service Corp.;
and Martin Emmett, chairperson and CEO of Tambrands Inc). See also SEC to Rule on Shareholder
Rights, NEWSDAY, Sept. 22, 1992, at 31 (business groups fighting shareholder communication
proposals and SEC Commissioner criticizing compensation disclosure rules as being confusing).
106. Lublin, supra note 105, at B1.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Gilbert Fuchsberg, Investors May Seek Vote on Executive Pay Consultants.
WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1992, at B 1; Susan Pulliam, Big Investors and Even Money Managers Join
Holder Calls for Better Bottom Lines, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1993, at C1; Susan Pulliam, Calpers
Goes over CEOs' Heads in its Quest for HigherReturns, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1993, at C1.
109. See John Pound, Freeing the Proxy Rules, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1992, § 3 (Business), at
11.
110. Id.
111. Peter Gerardo, Panel: New Proxy Rules Shouldn't Lead to Wave of ShareholderActivity,
STATE BAR NEWS, Mar. 1993, at 16.

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

V. Achieving Fairness in Executive Compensation
The way compensation packages for top corporate management are

arrived at is unique in the realm of compensation for highly paid
individuals. Corporate executives attempt to compare their remuneration
with that of entertainment and sports stars, concluding that if the stars'
compensation is not limited by legislation, theirs too should be
uncontrolled." 2 Frequently, disgruntled comments appear in the press
about the huge salaries being paid sports figures or rock and movie
stars;" however, team owners, record companies and movie producers
have bargained hard to pay out the lowest salaries possible. Ultimately,
they pay Barry Bonds and Barbra Streisand millions of dollars because
those stars will take their services to other willing employers if their
In spite of their tremendous
salary demands are not met." 4
that the stars' talents will still
judge
remuneration, employers of stars

translate into tremendous profits for the employers.

Only corporate

officers do not need agents to bargain with their employers, the corporate
directors. There is such an alignment of interests between them, that
corporate boards willingly pay their CEOs tens of millions of dollars." 5

112. Michael Siconolfi, Wall Street Upset by Clinton's Support on Ending Tax Break for
'Excessive' Pay, WALL ST. J., at C I (quoting Alan "Ace" Greenberg, chairperson and CEO of Bear
Steams Cos., who suggests that if tax deductibility of executive compensation is limited then the
same limitation should apply to the pay of Michael Jackson and athletes). One commentator
disdainfully explains how the Clinton tax proposals will affect the multimillion dollar pay of the
corporate executive much more adversely than the multimillion dollar pay of rock stars. Richard
B. McKenzie, The Mick JaggerLoophole, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1992, at AI4.
113. See, e.g., William Power & Michael Siconolfi, Merrill's Schreyer Gets Fat Pay Package
for '91, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1992, at CI (quoting Alan "Ace" Greenberg, Chairperson of Bear
Steams Cos., questioning whether Michael Jackson and baseball players are worth what they get
paid).
114. See, e.g. Michael Leahy, The Innocents ofSummer: The Wide-eyed, Brand-New, Low Paid
ColoradoRockies Take the Field under Baseball's Darkening Skies, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1993, at
16 (noting that baseball's San Francisco Giants offered $43.75 million to Barry Bonds); Chuck
Philips, Streisand Confirms Sony Pact, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1992, § F, at 22 (noting that Barbara
Streisand signed a film and recording contract with the Sony Corporation potentially worth $60
million).
115. In 1990, Steven Ross, then CEO of Time Warner Inc., received $78.1 million in salary
and bonuses. Paul A. Gigot, Potomac Watch: Executive Pay--An Embarrassment to Free
Marketers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1992, at A8. In 1991, William Schreyer, Chairperson of Merrill
Lynch & Co., received $16.8 million in salary, bonus and stock options. William Power & Michael
Siconolfi, Merrill's Schreyer Gets Fat Pay Packagefor '91, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1992, at C1.
In 1992, N. J. Nicholas, co-CEO at Time Warner, Inc. received between $24 million and $44.5
million upon his resignation. Amanda Bennett, Taking Stock--Big Firms Rely More on Options but
Fail to End Pay Criticism, WALL ST., J., Mar. 11, 1992, at Al. Thomas F. Frist, Jr., CEO of
HCA-Hospital Corp. of America, received total compensation of $127 million in 1992. Who Made
the Biggest Bucks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1993, at Rl. Sanford I. Weill, CEO at Primerica Corp.,
$67.4 million; Charles Lazarus, CEO at Toys "r" Us, $64.2 million; Leon C. Hirsch, CEO at
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Directors have good reason to be sympathetic to the desires of
corporate officers. The boards of the nation's 500 largest companies
have traditionally been filled with CEOs and retired CEOs." 6 Harold
Geneen, former Chairperson and CEO of International Telephone and
Telegraph, Inc., noted that
[niominally, outside directors are elected by the stockholders;
actually, in most instances they serve at the pleasure of the chief
executive.. . It is well known and accepted that only those men and
women who can "get along" [with the chief executive] are elected to
the board and stay on it. One might also ask how independent board
members can be if they accept all the perks heaped on them by the
management they are to judge." 7
In an ironic perversion of the usual process by which salary terms
are arrived at, some corporations have even hired an "agent" to work on
behalf of a new CEO in compensation negotiations." 8 Such an
arrangement makes it easy to infer that a consanguinity of interests exists
between the corporation, as represented by its directors, and the CEO.
Only the shareholders seem to be without representation. The process,
at its most extreme, has sometimes resulted in top management
negotiating their own employment contracts on behalf of themselves and
on behalf of the corporation." 9 The problem is how to make the

United States Surgical Corp., $60.7 million. Id. The median annual pay package for CEOs in 1992
was $1,050,000, about eight percent higher than in 1991. Median Pay for Top Execs Hits $1
Million, NEWSDAY, May 5, 1993, at 53.
116. John Perham, How Executives Get on Boards, DUN'S BUS. MONTH, Apr. 1985, at 54.
117. Harold S. Geneen, Why Directors Can't Protect the Shareholders, FORTUNE, Sept. 17,
1984, at 28. See also James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological
FoundationsandLegalImplications of CorporateCohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985)
(noting great monetary and non-monetary rewards given to corporate directors and fact that directors
are hand-picked by CEOs); Steven Prokesch, America's ImperialChief Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
12, 1986, § 3 (Business), at 25 (noting that "nominating committees to choose supposedly impartial
outside directors... act as the arm and will of the chief executive, who feeds them names" and that
"[bloard members have normally grown up in the same culture--even the same country clubs--as the
managers they are expected to oversee, and to come down hard on those managers runs against their
nature"); Victor Brudney, The IndependentDirector--HeavenlyCity or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV.
L. REv. 597, 611-13 (1982) (noting psychological and social reasons for directors' disinclination
to hold management colleagues at arm's length).
118. Julie Amparano Lopez, Management: Secret Weapon Usedin Setting Pay Packages, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 9, 1993, at BI. Joseph Bachelder, a New York attorney who specializes in executive
compensation issues, was hired by International Business Machines Corporation to work on behalf
of Louis V. Gerstner Jr., their new CEO, in the process of arriving at his pay package. Id. at B1,
B8.
119. See, e.g., Ex Parte Application For Temporary Restraining Order at App. A, 6,
Weinberger v, Shumway, Civ. No. 547586 (Super. Ct. Cal. Sept. 19, 1985) (order granting
temporary restraining order) (Chairperson of The Signal Companies testified that Signal's president
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process of arriving at executive compensation decisions more fair without
hamstringing the corporate governance process to such an extent that
shareholders are actually worse off than before.
During the last presidential campaign, Candidate Bill Clinton
asserted that he "would permit shareholders to determine the
compensation of top executives " " without clearly explaining how this
would be accomplished. Giving that much direct control to shareholders
would involve micromanagement which would probably create more
problems than it would solve. Moreover, it has traditionally been a
cardinal precept of corporation law that it is the directors who run the
company, not the shareholders.' 2' What shareholders probably want,
and should have, is management that is held more accountable for
performance and directors who view themselves as representatives of
When executive
shareholders rather than buddies of CEOs.'
compensation is the issue, directors should act as business owners
generally do when deciding on compensation for their employees. They
bargain at arms' length with their employees or employees'
representatives in an attempt to get the most for the least. Employers
will have to pay competitively to get competent workers; however, if
workers are not getting the job done, they generally will not be kept on
and given substantial raises to reward their poor performance.
To pressure directors to compensate executives reasonably, some
shareholder groups have advocated having shareholders vote each year
on the corporation's pay consultant the same way they do for the
corporation's auditor.23 When pay consultants depend on management
for their livelihood, they might be easily persuaded to recommend very
generous compensation packages. 124 Consultants argue that this voting

negotiated his own employment contract on behalf of himself and on behalf of Signal and that he had
no knowledge of anyone else from Signal participating in the negotiation).
120. KeyinG. Salwen, Clinton Backs Executive Pay Set by Holders, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1992,
at CI (quoting Bill Clinton).
121. See, e.g., DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)(1992). Section 141(a) states in pertinent part:
"The business and affairs of a corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or
under the direction of a board of directors except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or
in its certificate of incorporation."
122. The problem of directors not holding corporate executives accountable and shareholders
not being represented in the governance process was discussed in 1932 in a classic treatise by Berle
and Means. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE

PROPERTY 76-84, 116 (rev. ed. 1968). See also Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest
Proposalfor Improved Corporate Governance, BUS. LAW., Nov. 1992, at 59, 60-61.
123. Gilbert Fuchsberg, Investors May Seek Vote on Executive Pay Consultants. WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 27, 1992, at BI (citing Council of Institutional Investors, the principal trade group for pension
funds).
124. A well known pay consultant, Graef S. Crystal, reports an interesting story about Michael
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power would probably be ineffective because it is unlikely that
shareholders would override management's choice of consultant just as
they almost never veto management's choice of auditor. 2" Increased
watchdog activities of institutional investors, however, and the particular
appeal and seeming simplicity of the compensation issue to individual
shareholders suggest that they might take very seriously the right to
choose pay consultants. As of yet, the SEC has not approved such a
plan.
One commentator argues that there should be no new regulations in
the area of corporate governance because of the "uncertainty and
dislocation" they would cause."
This commentator asserted that
corporations are already doing "the right thing" and, therefore, all they
need is some encouragement.121 To support his position he cites the
Westinghouse Corporation as an example."2 Institutional investors and
activist shareholder groups' 29 targeted Westinghouse and threatened it
with shareholder proposals.'" Westinghouse management responded
by meeting with these shareholder representatives and agreeing to a
number of governance changes including the establishment of an
independent compensation committee with its own consultants.'
It
would be very desirable to be able to rely on this kind of private
cooperation to rectify corporate compensation excess. Realistically,
however, it is unlikely that such an exchange would be repeated at the
majority of American corporations. Shareholder threats (backed by the
perceived power to carry them out) to change Westinghouse's board of
directors, to prohibit the CEO from holding the position of chairperson,
32
and to hire their own consultant to explore financial restructuring
were very persuasive in making management amenable.
It is
unreasonable to expect that such shareholder power will be brought to
bear on the vast majority of corporations. m Without shareholder

D. Dingman, then chairperson and CEO of Wheelabrator-Frye, who expressed interest in starting
a bonus plan. When Mr. Crystal recommended that Mr. Dingman reduce his base pay, Mr.
Dingman reminded him that it was Dingman who had hired him as a consultant. Good Guys, Bad
Guys, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1992, § 3 (Business), at 6.
125. Fuchsberg, supra note 123, at B8.
126. JohnPound, Westinghouse Lights Boardroom Path, WALL ST.J., Dec. 11, 1992, at A12.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. The groups included the California Public Employees and State Teachers Retirement
Systems, the United Shareholders Association and the Council of Institutional Investors. Id.
130. Id.
131. Pound, supra note 126, at A12.
132. Id.
133. Warren F. Grienenberger, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance, in
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intimidation, it is unlikely that management will voluntarily invite
proposals to limit executive compensation.
Unlike an arbitrary one million dollar cap on executive
compensation," the most desirable limitation would be set by a goal
of reasonableness.
Executives should earn what is reasonable as
determined by directors who take seriously their responsibility to
maximize returns for shareholders. In some cases one million dollars
may be too much and in others it may be too little. The American Law
Institute suggests that circumstances may
warrant providing compensation at levels higher than might otherwise
be viewed as appropriate. For example, a corporation that is in
failing financial condition, or that is just starting in business, may
conclude that it is necessary to grant significantly larger inducements
to retain or attract valued executives than would be the case if the
business were well established and prospering."
Some additional regulation will probably be needed in order to achieve
boards populated by directors who are truly independent and, absent
personal motivations of greed and cronyism, can arrive at reasonable
compensation for executives.
Some of this independence might be achieved through the increasing
aggressiveness of institutional investors and shareholder
organizations. 3 6 Nevertheless, the process will be expedited and
assured with some additional congressional or SEC interference.' 37
After a phase-in period, boards should be required to have a majority of
independent directors. Compensation committees should also be required

PREPARATION OF ANNUAL DIsCLOSURE DOCUMENTS UNDER THE NEW PROXY RULES 1993, at 593,
App. B (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 799, 1993) (noting that United
Shareholders Association has targeted about twenty-two corporations for shareholder proposals about
golden parachutes and other compensation issues).

134. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 provision eliminates corporate tax
deductions for executive compensation exceeding one million dollars and provides an exception for
compensation that is linked to performance. Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13211, 107 Stat. 312, 469-71.
135. ALl, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, § 5.03 (Tentative Draft No. 11, 1992).
See also John E. Robson, With Executive Pay, Keep Exploring Options, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1992,
at A12 (asserting that cookie-cutter approach suggested by SEC in regulating executive compensation
.will not work and advocating solution based on director accountability).
136. A 1992 study showed that thirty percent of 809 large corporations barred inside directors
from serving on nominating committees. Stuart Mieher, Firms Restrict CEOs in Picking Board
Members, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1993, at BI. The nomination process is most important because
shareholders rarely reject a nominee. Id.

137.

See Victor Brdney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95

HARV. L. REV. 597, 658-59 (1982) (concluding that independent directors as a substitute for
regulation will be ineffective).
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to have only independent directors as members. 138 This requirement
of independence would eliminate the practice of paying consulting
retainers to directors.
Some commentators, trying to ensure
independence and effectiveness, have advocated the use of professional
directors for whom a directorship would be a full-time job.139 While
such professional directors would have more time to devote to their
directorial duties and could be chosen for their expertise, it is just those
factors that might encourage directors to encroach on the responsibilities
of management. This would be an undesirable result because it would
make it more difficult for top management to exert strong leadership and
to maintain clear accountability for business decisions.
There are other characteristics in directors that could be required in
order to further align their interests with the shareholders they are
representing. All directors could be required to have an equity interest
in the company, acquired with their own personal funds. To help
shareholders judge the independence of directors, corporations should be
required to disclose more information about independent directors, such
as on what other boards the directors serve.
More controversial than any of these requirements is the issue of
separating the positions of CEO and chairperson."4 As long as the
the Board's
CEO is the actual and titular head of the Board,'
4
2
independence is undermined.
When the CEO dominates the Board,
any semblance of checks and balances is removed and it becomes much
more difficult for the Board to be more than management's rubber

138. "Independent" should eliminate from consideration not only insiders, but also retired
executives of the corporation, those with an interest in businesses that do business with the
corporation, executives of businesses for which the corporation's executives serve as directors and
anyone else with an existing or potential conflict of interest. See Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 122,
at 67-69 (recommending ratio of at least two independent directors to any director connected to
company and compensation committee consisting of only independent directors); Joseph Hinsey, IV,
The Buck Starts Here, BUS. LAW TODAY, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 32, 34. But see Warren F.
Grienenberger, InstitutionalShareholdersand CorporateGovernance, in PREPARATION OF ANNUAL
DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS UNDER THE NEW PROxY RULES 1993, at 593, § III(A)(l)(a) (PLI Corp.
Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 799, 1993) (noting study that showed that companies
with greater percentage of inside directors had better operating results).
139. Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for
Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L'. REV. 863 (1991).
140. Eighty percent of corporations included in a 1992 survey had CEOs who were also
Chairpersons of the Board. Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 122, at 66 n. 24.
141. Abouteighty percent of major American corporations have a single CEO and Chairperson.
Joann S. Lublin, Other ConcernsAre Likely to Follow GM in Splitting Posts of Chairmanand CEO,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 1992, at BIO. In most of the other twenty percent, the chairperson is the
corporation's retired CEO. Id.
142. Id.; Checks and Balances at the Top, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, § 3 (Business), at 5.
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stamp. Not surprisingly, most CEOs are not in favor of such a
change. 43 They argue that the separation will limit their freedom in
running the business.'" That, however, may well be an advantage for
the company in that the directors are more likely to undertake their
oversight responsibilities in the corporate governance process. Arguably,
executive compensation has become a problem because of the CEO's
unchecked freedom in running the business. Furthermore, in order to
encourage the freedom of directors, their compensation should be set by
a formula based on corporate earnings over an extended period in order
to eliminate the obvious conflict created by having management
effectively decide directors' compensation, benefits and perquisites while
directors do the same for management.
VI. Conclusion
None of these changes will guarantee a successful company or even
one that is more circumspect in awarding executive compensation
packages. Both those goals are too dependent on, inter alia, the
personalities and compatibility of specific executives and directors.
Nevertheless, an adjustment in the balance of power between
management and directors is overdue when the former has few or no
restrictions from using the corporation for personal benefit. No system
for corporate governance will totally eliminate self-dealing; however,
changes are in order when the perception of the investing public is that
excessive pay for management is the cause of American business decline.
While that perception is certainly a simplistic appraisal, methods used to
correct the situation may also affect larger concerns of unchecked
managers focussing on short term solutions to long term problems. To
remain competitive in a global economy, American business cannot
afford to satisfy the greed of managers when foreign competitors do not
indulge in extravagant executive compensation. 45

143. In a 1992 survey of 653 CEOs, fewer than twenty-five percent favored separation. Joann
S. Lublin, Recent Wave of Activism in Boardroom Will Gain Momentum, Survey Suggests, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 9, 1992, at A4. Of 600 board members responding to the same survey, thirty-five
percent approved separating the roles of CEO and Chairperson. Id.
144. Lublin, supra note 141 (quoting Hicks Waldron, retired chairperson and CEO of Avon
Products, Inc.).
145. But see Roger Morrison, Two Views on a Split Personality, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991, at
17 (noting concern of shareholders of British companies about increases in executive compensation).

